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Abstract. A rms incentive to invest in product safety is a¤ected by both the market
environment and the liability when its product causes consumer harm. A long-standing
question in law and economics is whether competition can (partially) substitute for product
liability in motivating rms to improve product safety. We investigate this issue in a spatial
model of oligopoly with product di¤erentiation, where reputation provides a market incen-
tive for product safety and higher product liability may distort consumers incentive for
proper product care. We nd that partial liability, together with reputation concerns, can
motivate rms to make socially desirable safety investment. Increased competition due to
less product di¤erentiation lowers equilibrium market price, which diminishes a rms gain
from maintaining reputation and raises the socially desirable product liability. On the other
hand, an increase in the number of competitors reduces both the benet from maintaining
reputation and the potential cost savings from cutting back safety investment; consequently,
the optimal liability may vary non-monotonically with the number of competitors in the
market. In general, therefore, the relationship between competition and product liability is
subtle, depending on how competition is measured.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Market competition and product liability are two major mechanisms that a¤ect rms
incentives to increase product safety and prevent product harm to consumers. Extensive
studies in law and economics have examined the e¤ects of product liability and derived
optimal liability rules under a given market structure. However, there has been little formal
analysis of how competition and liability rules may interact to incentivize rms.1 This
is rather surprising, given the importance of product safety in many consumer markets.
What is the relationship between competition and the socially desired liability rules? Are
competition and product liability substitutes or complements in increasing product safety
and social welfare? This paper provides an economic analysis that aims to shed light on
these questions.
We consider a two-period spatial model with N  2 rms selling di¤erentiated products
to heterogenous consumers. The products may malfunction and cause consumer harm with
some probability. At the beginning of the rst period, each rm can decide whether to
invest in product safety. Investment leads to a safer product that causes less damage when
it fails. Consumers cannot observe rmssafety investments, but in the second period they
can observe the damages to the harmed consumers in the rst period and update their
beliefs about product safety. That is, there are reputation concerns for rms. If a rms
product causes consumer harm, it may need to compensate consumers according to product
liability rules. In particular, under partial liability the rm is required to compensate only
a proportion of consumer loss, whereas under full liability the rm is liable for the full
damage. While liability can motivate rms to invest in product safety, it is not without
undesirable incentive consequences due to the presence of two-sided moral hazard: After
purchase, consumers can take precaution to reduce the potential harm from product failure;
and high product liability lowers the consumersprecaution e¤orts.
We consider situations where investment in product safety is socially desirable. The
1A notable exception is Polinsky and Shavell (2010), who argue that market mechanisms and product
liability are substitutes as they both can increase product safety.
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choice of product liability is thus concerned with how to sustain the equilibrium where rms
make safety investment. If a rm chooses a low- instead of high-safety product, it faces high
(expected) liability costs and reputation loss. When reputation loss is high enough, the rm
will make the safety investment even without product liability, in which case the socially
optimal liability is zero in order to encourage consumer precaution. However, if reputation
concern is not su¢ cient, then product liability needs to be increased in order to sustain
the rms investment incentive. For a given number of competitors in the market, less
horizontal product di¤erentiation will reduce equilibrium market price so that the expected
reputation loss from o¤ering a low-safety product becomes smaller. Consequently, the
socially optimal liability is larger when competition becomes more erce due to reduced
product di¤erentiation. In this sense, competition and product liability are complements in
improving product safety and social welfare.
However, the socially optimal liability may vary non-monotonically with another measure
of competition intensity, the number of competitors. If a rm deviates from a high-safety
to a low-safety product, it benets from saving the xed cost of investment and the variable
production cost in period 1, but su¤ers from the potential extra liability cost in period 1
and the reputation loss in period 2. In period 1, a deviating rms net cost saving is the
sum of xed and variable production costs, minus the extra liability cost. A rm would
sell a high-quality product only when the reputation loss is larger than the net cost saving
from deviation. In our model, an increase in the number of competitors always reduces
the reputation loss from deviation, but has a non-monotonic impact on the net cost saving
from deviating to low safety in period 1. As a result, the optimal liability may vary non-
monotonically with the number of competitors, possibly rst decreasing and then increasing.
Thus, in general, the relationship between competition and product liability is subtle,
depending on the measure of competition intensity. While they can often be complements,
the relationship may also be non-monotonic when competition is measured by the number
of competitors in the market. Our results can shed light on the mixed empirical evidence
concerning the e¤ects of competition on rms investment incentives for product safety.
For example, a 2008 survey among product development managers in the US revealed
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that companies were more likely to reduce safety investment and to speed up new product
introductions, possibly with lower safety, when facing more competition (Lynn and Reiley,
2008). In the automobile industry, when more companies entered the market of SUVs,
many products had low quality and later caused substantial consumer harm (Los Angeles
Times, March 14, 2010). However, there have also been empirical studies showing that
competition can increase product quality, though most of the studies do not focus on safety
issues.2 Furthermore, there is empirical evidence suggesting that product liability can have
non-monotonic e¤ects on rmsinnovation incentives (e.g., Kip Viscusi and Moore, 1993).
Our paper contributes to the literature on product liability. Studies with a single rm
analyze, for example, the e¤ects of liability rules on a rms precaution to ensure product
safety (Simon, 1981), on its quality choice (Polinsky and Rogerson, 1983; Chen and Hua,
2012), or on its incentive to disclose quality information through price and other devices
(Daughety and Reinganum, 1995, 2008b). Studies with competition include Epple and Ra-
viv (1978), Cooper and Ross (1985), and Daughety and Reinganum (2006, 2008a). Polinsky
and Shavell (2010) argue that market mechanisms and product liability are substitutes as
they both can increase product safety. Our study provides a formal analysis on the re-
lationship between product liability and competition, and we nd that product liability
and competition can be either complements or subsititutes under alternative measures of
competition.
Our paper is also related to the literature in industrial organization, where market repu-
tation can be an e¤ective mechanism to improve product quality (e.g., Shapiro, 1983; Allen,
1984; Bagwell and Riordan, 1991; Kranton, 2003), and where market competition may have
either positive or negative impacts on product quality (e.g., Shaked and Sutton, 1987; Rior-
dan, 1986; Horner, 2002; Dana and Fong, 2011). We depart from the literature by focusing
on safety investments and product liability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model and derives
consumersprecaution e¤ort in equilibrium. Section 3 analyzes rmsinvestment incentives,
2For example, Mazzeo (2003) shows that airline companies had better on-time performance when there
was more competition. Matsa (2011) nds a positive relationship between product quality and competition
in the supermarket industry.
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and how changes in competition, measured alternatively by product di¤erentiation and
the number of competitors, a¤ect the socially optimal liability. Section 4 discusses some
modeling issues and concludes. Proofs are gathered in the appendix.
2. THE MODEL
A market has N  2 rms and a unit mass of consumers. Consumers are uniformly
distributed on a network of N(N 1)2 Hotelling lines of length 1, and the density of consumers
on each line is thus 2N(N 1) : Each rm is uniquely located at one end of each of N   1
Hotelling lines. In the static form of the model, rms choose prices simultaneously, with
rm i competing with every other rm j on a separate Hotelling line lij ; for j 6= i and
i; j = 1; :::; N: Each consumer, who values the product at V and demands at most one unit,
must travel to a rm in order to make a purchase, with unit transportation cost t > 0: A
consumer on lij is uniquely denoted by xij 2 [0; 1] ; whose distance is xij from rm i and
1   xij from rm j: Consumer xij will purchase the product if her net surplus from the
product  V minus price and transportation cost  is non-negative, and she patronizes
the rm with the highest net surplus between the two rms at the two ends of the Hotelling
line to which she belongs, i and j: Adapted from Chen and Riordans (2007) spokes model,
this model provides a tractable formulation of oligopoly price competition that extends the
Hotelling analysis to any number of rms with non-localized competition, where e¤ectively
each rm competes with every rm else for di¤erent segments of consumers.3 Notice that
it reduces to the standard Hotelling model when N = 2.
The static model described above is then embedded into a simple two-period dynamic
game with safety investment and product liability. Specically, each rms product may
cause consumer harm with probability . At the beginning of Period 1, a rm can choose
to invest k; which enables it to produce a high-safety product in both periods at variable
cost c  0:Without the investment, the product will be of low safety and zero variable cost.
After purchasing a product, a consumer can take precaution e¤ort. Without such e¤ort,
3For other recent applications of the spokes model, see, for example, Caminal (2010), Caminal and
Granero (2012), Germano and Meier (2013), Rhodes (2011), and Reggiani (2014).
5
if a consumer is harmed, her damage is d from a high-safety product and D > d from a
low-safety product.4 We dene z = D   d, and assume c < z. Then, if we ignore the
xed cost of investment, it is socially e¢ cient for rms to produce and sell the high-safety
product.
With precaution e¤ort, a consumer can reduce the damage by  2 [0; d).5 Each consumers
precaution cost is (), which is strictly increasing and convex, with (0) = 0; 0(0) = 0;
and 0(d) > : With consumer precaution, the expected damage level from a high-safety
product is (d  ), and the expected damage level from a low-safety product is (D   ).
If a consumer is harmed, the rm is required to compensate the consumer  fraction of
the damage according to its product liability. The rm bears "partial liability" if  < 1,
"full liability" if  = 1 and punitive damage compensation if  > 1. For simplicity, we focus
on the scenarios with   1:
In neither periods can consumers directly observe the rmsinvestments or product safety.
In Period 2, however, rms and consumers observe the damage levels su¤ered by harmed
consumers in Period 1. Consequently, they can update their beliefs about product safety.
In particular, if product j causes larger damage than all other products in Period 1, then
consumers in Period 2 will believe that product j has low safety while the other products
have high safety. We denote rm js total prot in two periods as j (Ij ; I j jB), where
(Ij ; I j) is a vector of investments by all N rms and B is consumersbelief in Period 1
about product safety. In our simple setting, consumers in Period 2 will always have the
correct belief about product quality, because with a continuum of consumers, fraction  of
consumers will be harmed in period 1, and the damage levels su¤ered by them, which reveal
product safety levels, are observed by all consumers at the beginning of Period 2. Hence
beliefs by all consumers in period 2 are denoted simply by B:
4For example, a rm can develop and install a high-safety device on the product (such as an airbag in
a car), which can reduce consumer damage if the product fails (e.g., if the car is in an accident possibly
due to break malfunction). We could alternatively assume that product safety a¤ects the likelihood for
consumers to be harmed. Our formulation with product safety a¤ecting the damage level is more convenient
for analysis.
5As shown later in this section, given this "additive" nature on potential damage, consumersoptimal
precaution e¤ort does not depend on the safety level of the product. This simplies our analysis. Our main
insight from the analysis could still hold if consumer precaution e¤ort were to depend on the safety level.
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To summarize, the timing of the model is as follows:
 Period 1:
 Stage 1: Each rm independently decides whether to invest in product safety,
Ij = 0 or k; j = 1; 2; :::; N .
 Stage 2: Firms simultaneously choose their prices pj , j = 1; 2:::; N; followed by
consumerspossible purchases.
 Stage 3: Each consumer chooses her precaution e¤ort  after purchase.
 State 4: If any consumer is harmed by a rms product, the rm bears liability
  1.
 Period 2: Consumers observe the damage levels to the harmed consumers. Stages 2-4
in period 1 are then repeated, with rm j0s price in period 2 denoted by qj :
Throughout the paper, we make the following assumption to ensure the full coverage of
the market:
A1: V  32 t+ c+ [D + (d)]:
Before analyzing the rmsstrategies, we rst examine consumersprecaution e¤ort and
the e¢ cient safety investment. If all N rms make the safety investment and all consumers
purchase, in two periods the total costs to produce the high-safety product is Nk+2c, with
social benet 2(D   d) = 2z: Hence, without consumer precaution, it is e¢ cient for all
the rms to invest in safety if and only if 2z  Nk + 2c.
Regardless of whether the purchased product has high or low safety, each consumer
will choose  to minimize her expected loss from product malfunction (excluding liability
compensation):
max

f(1  )   ()g ; (1)
and the optimal   () satises the rst order condition:
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(1  )   0() = 0: (2)
Since () is convex and 0(d) > ; we have  () < d for any ; and () decreases
in . Intuitively, when product liability () is larger, consumers expect to receive more
compensation from the rm if they are harmed, which reduces their incentive to take pre-
caution. However, e¢ ciency requires that every consumer takes precaution to maximize
   (): Therefore, as the result below states, given the rmsinvestment decisions, con-
sumersprecaution e¤ort becomes more e¢ cient, or total welfare improves, when liability
is smaller.6
Lemma 1 Given the rmssafety investments, consumersprecaution e¤ort () and total
welfare are higher when product liability  is lower.
The observation above that consumersprecaution incentives decrease in product liability
will play an important role in our analysis to follow, where rmssafety investment incentives
will be shown to increase in product liability. This conict will lead to some unique (possibly
interior) liability that maximizes total welfare.
We will be interested in situations where 2z   Nk   2c > maxf   ()g; so that
investment in high safety is always e¢ cient. For this purpose our analysis will further
assume
A2: N  N; with N  2z 2c maxf ()gk > 2:
3. COMPETITION AND PRODUCT LIABILITY
In this section, we will derive the rms equilibrium strategies and then address two
questions. First, given the number of competitors, how will changes in the degree of product
di¤erentiation, a measure of competition intensity, impact the socially optimal liability?
6This result is consistent with ndings in the literature on strict liability rule and negligence rules.
Brown (1973) shows that strict liability does not induce victims to take care, while negligence rules may
lead both injurers and victims to take optimal care. Rubinfeld (1987) and Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar (2003)
also examine comparative negligence rules with bilateral due care.
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Second, how will the change in market structure (i.e., the number of competitors) a¤ect
the optimal liability? In addressing these questions, we also investigate whether market
competition and product liability are complements or substitutes in increasing product
safety and welfare.
3.1 High-Safety Equilibrium
We focus on the symmetric equilibrium where all N rms invest in product safety (i.e.,
choose high safety) and charge the same price. On the equilibrium path, consumers will
have the correct belief about product safety. For any consumer xij 2 [0; 1] on lij , i 6= j;
and i; j 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng; she is indi¤erent between products i and j if
V  xijt pi  [(1 )(d )+()] = V  (1 xij)t pj  [(1 )(d )+()]; (3)
where [(1 )(d  )+()]; which we shall call a consumers expected damage, consists
of her expected loss when a product malfunctions and her cost of exerting precaution e¤ort.
Given the same product safety for both rms, a consumers expected damages from the two
products cancel each other in (3). Hence, given that all other rms charge p; the per-period
demand for product j is
X
i6=j;i2f1;::Ng
2
N (N   1)
t  pj + p
2t
=
2
N
t  pj + p
2t
: (4)
In period 1, along the equilibrium path, rm j chooses price pj to maximize its prot:
max
pj
[pj   c  (d  )] 2
N
t  pj + p
2t
; (5)
where (d  ) is the rms expected liability cost per unit of sales. Similarly, it chooses
qj to maximize its second-period prot. It is straightforward to establish the following:
Lemma 2 Suppose that all rms choose high safety, i.e., I = k: Then, there is a unique
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symmetric equilibrium where each rm sets price p = q = t+c+(d ) in each period,
sells 1N units of output in each period, and earns  = 2
t
N   k total prot in two periods.
Each rms e¤ective marginal cost in each period is c^  [c+ (d  )] ; and the equilib-
rium price is t+ c^; same as in the standard Hotelling model. Intuitively, each rms prot
decreases when there are more competitors or when there is less product di¤erentiation.
Note that liability does not a¤ect the rmsprots on the equilibrium path, because at the
symmetric equilibrium where all the rms have the same product safety, consumers face the
same expected damage from all rms, so that the liability level merely shifts the equilibrium
price (p) without a¤ecting the equilibirum markup (p   c^).
We next turn to the investment decisions by rms. At the proposed equilibrium where
all rms choose I = k; suppose that one rm, say rm 1, deviates to I = 0. In period 1,
if rm 1 sets p1 = p = t + c + (d   ); the demand for its product is still 1N but its
expected liability cost is higher; so that rm 1s expected prot in Period 1 is
[p   (D   )] 1
N
=
t+ c  z
N
:
If rm 1 instead chooses a price di¤erent from p; consumersbelief is that rm 1s product
has low quality while the other products still have high quality. Given that all the other
rms charge p; the demand for product 1 in period 1 would be
2
N
max

t  p1 + p   (1  )z
2t
; 0

; (6)
provided t p1+p
 (1 )z
2t < 1:
Firm 1s optimal price after deviation in period 1 therefore solves:
max
p1
[p1   (D   )] 2
N
max

t  p1 + p   (1  )z
2t
; 0

: (7)
When t > z c2 ; the optimal deviating price under p1 6= p is ~p1 = t+ (D  )  z c2 ;
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with rm 1s deviating prot in period 1 as
[~p1   (D   )] 2
N
t  z c2
2t
=
(t  z c2 )2
Nt
=
t
N
 

z   c
N
  (z   c)
2
4Nt

: (8)
Thus, when t > z c2 ; rm 1s optimal deviating prot in period 1 is
max

t+ c  z
N
;
t+ c
N
  1
N

z   (z   c)
2
4t

=
1
N
 
t+ c min
(
z; (t+ c)  (t 
z c
2 )
2
t
)!
;
which can be shown to be positive:
When t  z c2 ; rm 1 would sell zero if it charges p1 6= p and is thus known to have low
quality. If rm 1 instead charges p; its prot in period 1 would be t+c zN . Thus rm 1s
optimal deviating prot in period 1 would be
max

t+ c  z
N
; 0

=
1
N
(t+ c min fz; t+ cg) :
The result below follows straightforwardly from the discussion above:
Lemma 3 Suppose that rm 1 deviates to low safety while the other rms choose high
safety. Then in period 1: the deviating rm will choose p1 = p when t > z c2 and
  1  (z c)24tz or when t  z c2 and   t+cz ; but will choose p1 = ~p1  t+ (D )  z c2
when t > z c2 and  > 1  (z c)
2
4tz or when t  z c2 and  > t+cz : Firm 1s deviating prot
in period 1 is 1N
h
t+ c min
n
z; (t+ c)  t>t1 (t t1)
2
t
oi
; where t1  z c2 , and t>t1 is
an indicator function that equals 1 if t > t1 and 0 otherwise.
Firm 1s deviating prot in period 1 can be understood intuitively. Recall that, with-
out deviation, rm 1s prot in period 1 (excluding investment cost k) would be tN . By
deviating to low safety, rm 1 saves costs c but su¤ers from additional liability costs or rev-
enue reduction min
n
z; (t+ c)  t>t1 (t t1)
2
t
o
, which depends on the level of horizontal
product di¤erentiation.
The deviating rm desires to charge price higher than p to partly cover the higher ex-
pected liability cost, but this lowers consumer demand for its product. The latter e¤ect
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does not depend on product liability , since the rms pricing decision fully incorporates
consumersexpected damage, whereas the former e¤ect increases in product liability. There-
fore, when liability is small, the latter e¤ect dominates and the deviating rm would charge
p:
When liability is large enough, however, the former e¤ect dominates and the deviating
rm would charge a price di¤erent from p: In this case, the deviating rm is known to
have a low safety product. If t > t1, the deviating rm can still make positive prot due to
large horizontal product di¤erentiation; but if t  t1; or product di¤erentiation is small, the
deviating rm cannot have positive sales at a protable price, and hence it has zero sales.
In Period 2, along the equilibrium path, each rm sets price q = p: If rm 1 has deviated
to I = 0; it will be known as the less safer rm in period 2, because with a continuum of
consumers, a positive proportion of consumers will experience product malfunction from
each rm and the larger damage of rm 1s product when that happens. Suppose that the
prices are qj ; j = 1; :::; N following rm 1s deviation: Then consumer x1j on l1j , for j 6= 1;
is indi¤erent between products 1 and j if
V  x1jt q1 [(1 )(D )+()] = V  (1 x1j)t qj [(1 )(d )+()]: (9)
The demand for product 1 in Period 2 is thus
F1 (q1; :::; qN ) =
2
N (N   1)
X
j2f2;::Ng
max

min

t  q1 + qj   (1  )z
2t
; 1

; 0

; (10)
where we recall z  D   d: Firm 1 chooses q1 to maximize its prot in Period 2:
max
q1
[q1   (D   )]F1 (q1; :::; qN ) : (11)
For any rm j 6= 1; it competes for two types of consumers: consumers located on lj1,
and consumers located on ljm; for m 6= j and m 6= 1. For consumers located on lj1, their
demand for product j is 2N(N 1) max
n
min
n
t+q1 qj+(1 )z
2t ; 1
o
; 0
o
: For consumers located
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on ljm, given that products j and m have the same quality, their total demand for product
j is 2N(N 1) max[min(
t+qm qj
2t ; 1); 0]: Hence, the total demand for product j 6= 1 in Period 2
is
Fj (q1; :::; qN ) =
2max
n
min
n
t+q1 qj+(1 )z
2t ; 1
o
; 0
o
N (N   1) +
X
m6=j;m 6=1;m2f1;::Ng
max

min

t+ qm   qj
2t
; 1

; 0

:
(12)
Firm j 6= 1 chooses qj to maximize its prot in Period 2:
max
qj
[qj   c  (d  )]Fj (q1; :::; qN ) : (13)
We have:
Lemma 4 Suppose that rm 1 has low safety while the other rms have high safety. Then,
rm 1s prot in Period 2, with rms choosing Nash equilibrium prices in this subgame, is
1
N

t>t2
(t  t2)2
t

; (14)
where t2  t2(N)  N 12N 1(z   c); and t>t2 equals 1 if t > t2 and 0 otherwise.
As we show in the appendix, with rms choosing Nash equilibrium prices in the subgame
of period 2, F1 (q1; :::; qN ) > 0 if t > N 12N 1(z  c), while F1 (q1; :::; qN ) = 0 if t  N 12N 1(z 
c). Firm 1s prot in period 2 is positive when t > N 12N 1(z   c); whereas its prot is zero
when t is small so that rm 1 has zero output in period 2 after the deviation.
According to Lemma 4, liability does not a¤ect rms prots in period 2 even under
the scenario where rm 1 has low safety and the other rms have high safety. Consider
competition between rm 1 and rm j, j 6= 1; in period 2: On one hand, rm 1 and rm
j face di¤erent expected liability costs (z), so that they may charge di¤erent prices in
the subgame. On the other hand, in period 2, consumers have the correct belief about
the di¤erence in safety between rm 1 and rm j, and correspondingly the di¤erence in
their expected loss ((1 )z), which a¤ects demand levels for the two rmsproducts. As
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shown in the appendix, by a¤ecting both di¤erences in rmsliability costs and consumer
preferences, liability level () only impacts rmsequilibrium prices in this subgame but
does not inuence their markups or output levels.
From Lemmas 3 and 4, rm 1s total prot in two periods following the deviation is
d =
2t+ c
N
  1
N
min

z; (t+ c)  t>t1
(t  t1)2
t

  1
N

t  t>t2
(t  t2)2
t

: (15)
Therefore, a rms potential gain (or loss) from deviating to low safety (i.e., the change
in the rms prot due to the deviation) is
 d = 1
N
min

z; (t+ c)  t>t1
(t  t1)2
t

  1
N

t  t>t2
(t  t2)2
t

 

k +
c
N

; (16)
where the rst term on the right hand side is the extra liability cost or revenue reduction
in period 1 if the rm deviates, the third term (k + cN ) is the cost saving in Period 1 if the
rm deviates to no investment, and the second term, dened as
(N)  1
N

t  t>t2
(t  t2)2
t

;
is the "reputation loss" in period 2. We thus have:
Proposition 1 There exists an equilibrium where all rms produce the high-safety product
if and only if
1
N
min

z; (t+ c)  t>t1
(t  t1)2
t

+(N)  k + c
N
: (17)
It can be veried that (N) < 1N (z  c) and 1N min
n
z; (t+ c)  t>t1 (t t1)
2
t
o
  cN <
1
N (z   c): Therefore, condition (17) is consistent with (A2): Intuitively, if the reputation
loss in Period 2 is large enough, rms would make safety investments even without product
liability. If the reputation loss is small, then product liability need to be increased to
motivate investments. However, there is an upper bound of the e¤ect from increasing
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liability. As shown in Lemma 3, if product liability is large enough, when a rm deviates
to low safety, it would adjust its price in period 1 so that its deviating prot would not
depend on liability. In this scenario, increasing liability further would not increase the rms
investment incentives.
Dening the socially optimal liability as N that ensures condition (17) to hold, we have
the following Corollary from Proposition 1:
Corollary 1 There exist two cut-o¤ values k1 = (N)   cN and k2 = (N) + 1N [t  
t>t1
(t t1)2
t ] > k1: If k  k2; the high-safety equilibrium exists where all rms choose I = k;
N = 0 when k  k1, while N = Nk+c N(N)z > 0 and N decreases in z when k1 < k  k2:
If k > k2; the socially optimal liability is zero and the high-safety equilibrium does not exist.
Corollary 1 characterizes the socially optimal liability that ensures the existence of the
high-safety equilibrium. We next examine how the optimal product liability depends on
competition, considering in turn two alternative measures of competition intensity: product
di¤erentiation between rms and the number of rms in the market.
3.2 Product Liability and Product Di¤erentiation
In our spatial model of oligopoly, consumersunit transportation cost (t); which indicates
their preference heterogeneity or the degree of product di¤erentiation, is a natural measure
of the intensity of competition. When t decreases, consumers are less heterogenous, which
reduces product di¤erentiation and lowers equilibrium market prices. The result below
shows that the optimal liability generally increases when competition is more severe in the
sense that t decreases.
Proposition 2 Holding all other parameter values constant, there exist two cut-o¤ values
tL < tH such that: (i) when t  tL or t  tH , the socially optimal liability N is zero, and
(ii) when tL < t < tH ; N is positive and strictly decreases in t:
Thus, product liability and market competition tends to be complements, when com-
petition intensity is measured by the degree of product di¤erentiation. When there is less
15
consumer heterogeneity or less product di¤erentiation, the rms compete more aggressively,
resulting in less prot from being known as a high-safety producer in period 2. Then, if a
rm deviates to no investment, its "reputation loss" in period 2 would be smaller. This in-
creases the rms incentive to deviate. Consequently, to sustain the high-safety equilibrium,
product liability should be increased to raise the deviation cost.
3.3 Product Liability and the Number of Competitors
We next examine how the optimal product liability may vary with the number of com-
petitors. Di¤erent from the degree of product di¤erentiation, the number of competitors
a¤ects not only the reputation loss from deviation; but also each rms output level which
in turn changes a rms net cost savings from deviation. The net e¤ect of a change in the
number of competitors on the optimal liability can thus be ambiguous. For convenience, we
should treat N as a continuous variable in our analysis.
Lemma 5 At the high-safety equilibrium, a rms reputation loss from deviating to low
safety, (N); strictly decreases in N:
As stated in Corollary 1, when N > 0, it satises
(N) = k +
1
N
(c  Nz):
The term on the right-hand side above is the net cost saving for the deviating rm in period
1. If (N)  k; then c   Nz  0; and if (N) < k; then c   Nz < 0: Therefore, the
net cost saving for the deviating rm in period 1 may decrease or increase in N; depending
on the sign of c   Nz: In the appendix, we show that N(N) is a concave function in
N . Dene 	(N) = d[N(N)]dN : The result below shows that, holding all other parameters
constant, the optimal liability may vary non-monotonically with the number of competitors.
Proposition 3 Suppose that N > 0 for N 2 [N1; N2] ; with 2  N1 < N2  N: (i) If
	(N2) < k < 	(N1); then there exists some bN 2 (N1; N2) such that, for any N 2 [N1; N2],
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the optimal liability N decreases in N for N < bN and increases in N for N > bN: (ii) If
k  	(N2); then N decreases in N for any N 2 [N1; N2]: (iii) If k  	(N1); then N
increases in N for any N 2 [N1; N2]:
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is as follows. If a rm deviates from high safety to
low safety, it benets from saving the xed cost of investment and the variable production
cost in period 1, but su¤ers from the extra liability cost in period 1 and the reputation loss
in period 2. In period 1, a deviating rms net cost saving is the sum of xed and variable
production costs, minus the extra liability cost. A rm would sell a high-safety product only
when the reputation loss is larger than the net cost savings from deviation. An increase in
the number of competitors always reduces the reputation loss from deviation (due to each
rms lower output), while the net cost savings from deviation, as we argued earlier, may
vary non-monotonically with the number of competitors. Now consider two cases.
First, if the number of competitors (N) is relatively small, reputation loss from deviation
is large, so that the optimal liability cost sustaining the high-safety equilibrium is smaller
than the variable production cost (i.e., Nz < c). In this case, a deviating rms net cost
saving in period 1 (k + 1N (c   Nz)) decreases in N . Thus, when N increases, while the
decreased reputation loss raises the rms incentive for deviation, the decreased net cost
saving reduces it. For small enough N , the latter e¤ect dominates, and hence the optimal
liability decreases in N . In this case, competition and product liability are substitutes to
achieve high product safety and also e¢ ciency.
Second, if the number of competitors is relatively large; the reputation loss from deviation
is small, so that the optimal liability cost sustaining the high-safety equilibrium is larger
than the variable production cost. In this case, a deviating rms net cost saving in period
1 increases in the number of competitors. When N increases, both the decreased reputation
loss and the increased net cost saving raises the rmsincentive for deviation. Therefore,
the optimal liability must be increased to maintain the rmsinvestment incentive. In this
case, competition and product liability become complements to achieve high product safety
and also e¢ ciency.
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When N is not too small, it is likely that there exist some N1 < N2 such that N > 0 for
N 2 [N1; N2] : To illustrate Proposition 3, consider the following numeric example.
Example 1 Let z = 2; t = 1; c = 1 and k = 0:01:7 In addition, let maxf   ()g < 1:
Then, we nd that N > 0 for any N 2 [2; N ]; and bN = 6: That is, the socially optimal
liability rst decreases in N when N < 6 and then increases in N when 6 < N < N; as
shown in Figure 1 below:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0.16
0.18
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Figure 1: Optimal Liability
The following corollary considers some special cases of Proposition 3. When product
di¤erentiation is su¢ ciently small or the variable cost of providing high safety becomes
zero, the socially optimal liability always increases with the number of competitors.
Corollary 2 (1) If t  z c3 and N > 0 for N 2 [N1; N2] ; with 2  N1 < N2  N:; then
N strictly increases in N for any N 2 [N1; N2]: (2) If c = 0 and N > 0 for N 2 [N1; N2] ;
with 2  N1 < N2  N; then N strictly increases in N for any N 2 [N1; N2]:
In practice, rms can adopt various technologies or methods to improve product safety and
reduce consumer damage. For example, if rms can take R&D projects to improve product
7For illustration, we choose small k so that Nk is not too large when N becomes large. As discussed in
Section 2, if Nk is too large, it is socially e¢ cient not to make investments in product safety. Notice that for
convenience we have normalized the size of consumer population to 1. If consumer population size is large,
then k can also be large for our numerical example.
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safety and warn consumers about the potential harm, then the relevant costs for rms are
mainly xed costs instead of variable costs. In such cases, as shown in Corollary 2, product
liability and competition as measured by the number of competitors are complements. In
industries with more competitors, liability should be increased to motivate rms R&D
e¤ort. In contrast, if rms not only incur xed R&D costs but also add safety devices
with variable costs to increase product safety, then product liability and competition can
be either substitutes or complements, as shown in Proposition 3.
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper has studied the relationship between competition and product liability in
their roles to improve product safety and e¢ ciency. We nd that this relationship is subtle,
depending importantly on what causes the change in competition intensity. Under a given
market structure, when competition increases due to less product di¤erentiation, the socially
optimal product liability generally increases. In this sense, competition and product liability
are complements. On the other hand, as competition increases because the number of
competitors rises, the optimal product liability may vary non-monotonically, rst decreasing
and then increasing. We further explain why the alternative measures of competition a¤ect
product liability di¤erently: more competition under these two measures will both reduce
a rms future prot and hence the reputation loss from producing a low-safety product,
which calls for higher product liability; but more competitors have the additional e¤ect
of decreasing each rms output in the market, potentially lowering the cost savings from
deviating to a low-cost/low-safety product, and this e¤ect can dominate when the number
of competitors starts to increase from a relatively low level, leading to initial decreases in
the optimal product liability.
We have conducted our analysis in a variant of the spokes model that extends the classic
Hotelling duopoly. We wish to allow product di¤erentiation between rms in the market,
for which the Hotelling model is known to have very desirable features. To extend Hotelling
to an oligopoly with any number of rms, one motivation to use the spokes model in stead
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of, say, the circle model (Salop, 1979), is that when only one rm deviates from safety
investment, in the subgame of period 2 there is a two-price equilibrium that is easy to
characterize analytically in the spokes model, because all N   1 rms remain symmetric to
each other and with respect to the deviating rm. By contrast, in the circle model, rms
are not symmetric as they are farther away from the deviating rm in each direction, and
hence in the equilibrium of period 2 following a rms deviation, there will be at least N2
distinctive prices, which could be extremely di¢ cult, if not impossible, to characterize for
an arbitrary N:
Our results are derived under several strong assumptions, and should thus be interpreted
with caution. In addition to postulating a specic model of oligopoly competition, our
assumption on the safety investment, with only two possible levels and with its only e¤ect
as reducing consumer damages when the product malfunctions, is obviously very crude. Our
highly-stylized setting in which reputation works, with only two periods and with consumers
perfect ability to detect a low-safety product in period 2, is also rather restrictive. While
these modeling choices are motivated mainly by analytical tractability, it would be desirable
for future research to extend our analysis in other and more general settings.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 2:
Consider rm j0s pricing decision in period 1. Suppose that all other rms set their
prices as p: As long as  t  pj  p < t, the per-period demand for product j becomes
2
N(N 1)(N  1)
t pj+p
2t : Correspondingly, rm j chooses its price to maximize its per-period
prot
max
pj
[pj   c  (d  )] 2
N
t  pj + p
2t
: (18)
The rst order condition leads to pj = p = t + c + (d   ). It can be veried that
the second order condition holds. Correspondingly, the per-period demand for each rms
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product is 1N . The analysis for period 2 is the same. Therefore, each rms total prot in
two periods is 2[p   (d  )] 1N   k = 2tN   k:
Proof of Lemma 4:
Suppose that rm 1 sells a low safety product while all the other rms sell the high safety
product. Given that all products except for rm 1s product have the same quality, we focus
on the symmetric pricing decision for any rm j 6= 1. First, assume that F1 (q1; :::; qN ) 2
(0; 1) and Fj (q1; :::; qN ) 2 (0; 1). That is, every rm has positive output. Thus, rm 1s
maximization problem is
max
q1
8<:[q1   (D   )] 2N(N   1) X
j2f2;::Ng
t  q1 + qj   (1  )z
2t
9=; : (19)
The rst order condition is
t  2q1 + qj   (1  )(D   d) + (D   ) = 0: (20)
For any j 6= 1;its maximization problem is
max
qj
8<:[qj   c  (d  )] 2N(N   1)
24 t+ q1   qj + (1  )z
2t
+
X
m6=j;m 6=1;m2f1;::Ng
t+ qm   qj
2t
359=; :
In equilibrium, qm = qj for m 6= j;m 6= 1: The rst order condition leads to
(N   1)t Nqj + q1 + (1  )(D   d) + (N   1)(d  )  (N   1)c = 0: (21)
Solving (20) and (21), we have the optimal prices as
~q1 = t+ (D   )  N   1
2N   1(z   c);
~qj = t+ c+ (d  ) + 1
2N   1(z   c) for any j 6= 1:
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If t > N 12N 1(z   c),
t  ~q1 + ~qj   (1  )z
2t
=
t  N 12N 1(z   c)
2t
2 (0; 1):
Correspondingly, F1 (~q1; :::; ~qN ) 2 (0; 1) and Fj (~q1; :::; ~qN ) 2 (0; 1): And rm 1s prot in
period 2 is
[~q1   (D   )] 2
N
1
N   1(N   1)
t  N 12N 1(z   c)
2t
=
[t  N 12N 1(z   c)]2
Nt
:
If t  N 12N 1(z   c), however, F1 (~q1; :::; ~qN ) = 0: And rm 1s prot in period 2 is zero.
Proof of Corollary 1:
Dene k1  (N)  cN and
k2  (N) + 1
N
[(t+ c)  t>t1
(t  t1)2
t
]  c
N
= (N) +
1
N
[t  t>t1
(t  t1)2
t
]:
Given t  t>t1 (t t1)
2
t > 0; we have k2 > k1:
First, when k  k1;
1
N
min

z; (t+ c)  t>t1
(t  t1)2
t

+(N) > k +
c
N
for any : That is, the rms make investments given any liability level. According to Lemma
1, consumer precaution e¤ort is largest when  = 0. Therefore, N = 0:
Second, when k1 < k  k2; consider small  such that min
n
z; (t+ c)  t>t1 (t t1)
2
t
o
=
z: Then each rm makes investment if and only if 1Nz +(N)  k + cN . The lowest
liability motivating each rm to make investment satises 1Nz + (N) = k +
c
N ; i.e.,
 = Nk+c N(N)z : If  =
Nk+c N(N)
z ; we have
z = Nk + c N(N)  Nk2 + c N(N) = (t+ c)  t>t1
(t  t1)2
t
;
and therefore, min
n
z; (t+ c)  t>t1 (t t1)
2
t
o
= z: According to Lemma 1, N =
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Nk+c N(N)
z :
Finally, when k > k2;
k +
c
N
> k2 +
c
N
= (N) +
1
N
[(t+ c)  t>t1
(t  t1)2
t
]
 1
N
min

z; (t+ c)  t>t1
(t  t1)2
t

+(N):
Therefore, rms have no incentive to make investments. From Lemma 1, the optimal
liability should thus be N = 0:
Proof of Proposition 2:
Note that if t > t2;
(N) =
1
N

t  t>t2
(t  t2)2
t

=
1
N
(
2
N   1
2N   1(z   c) 
1
t

N   1
2N   1(z   c)
2)
;
and if t  t2; (N) = tN : Therefore, given the other parameters, (N) = (N; t) strictly
increases in t. Correspondingly, k1 = (N)  cN and k2 = (N) + 1N [t  t>t1 (t t1)
2
t ] also
strictly increase in t. Given any k, let tL satisfy k = (N; tL) + 1N [tL   tL>t1 (tL t1)
2
tL
] and
tH satisfy k = (N; tH)  cN : It can be veried that tL < tH :
When t  tL, we have
k = (N; tL) +
1
N

tL   tL>t1
(tL   t1)2
tL

 (N; t) + 1
N

t  t>t1
(t  t1)2
t

= k2:
Hence, from Corollary 1, N = 0:
When t  tH ; we have
k = (N; tH)  c
N
 (N; t)  c
N
= k1:
Hence, from Corollary 1, N = 0:
When tL < t < tH ; we have k1 < k < k2: Hence, from Corollary 1, N =
Nk+c N(N)
z >
0: Since (N) strictly increases in t; N strictly decreases in t:
Proof of Lemma 5:
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Recall that(N) = 1N
h
t  t>t2 (t t2)
2
t
i
, where t2 = N 12N 1(z c); and t2 strictly increases
in N .
If t  t2; then (N) = tN , which strictly decreases in N:
If t > t2; we have
(N) =
1
N
(
2
N   1
2N   1(z   c) 
1
t

N   1
2N   1(z   c)
2)
:
Di¤erentiating (N); we have, for N  2:
0(N) =
z   c
N2

N
(2N   1)2

2  2z   c
t
N   1
2N   1

  N   1
2N   1

2  z   c
t
N   1
2N   1

<
z   c
N2

N
(2N   1)2

2  2z   c
t
N   1
2N   1

  N
2N   1

2  z   c
t
N   1
2N   1

=
(z   c)N
N2(2N   1)

1
(2N   1)

2  2z   c
t
N   1
2N   1

  2 + z   c
t
N   1
2N   1

:
Since 2  2 z ct N 12N 1 < 2N   1 for N  2; and z ct N 12N 1 < 1 when t > t2 = N 12N 1(z   c);
we have 0(N) < 0. That is, (N) strictly decreases in N:
Proof of Proposition 3:
Corollary 1 implies that N = Nk+c N(N)z > 0 if and only if k1 < k < k2: In the
following, we will consider three di¤erent scenarios.
Scenario A: Suppose that t > t1  z c2 : Then we always have t > z c2 > N 12N 1(z c) 
t2: Correspondingly, (N) = 1N [t  (t t2)
2
t ]: Thus,
N(N) = 2
N   1
2N   1(z   c) 
1
t
[
N   1
2N   1(z   c)]
2:
Let  (N)  N(N) for N  2: We have
0(N) = [2  2z   c
t
N   1
2N   1]
z   c
(2N   1)2 > 0:
Furthermore, note that N 12N 1 increases in N and therefore [2   2 z ct N 12N 1 ] decreases in
N: In addition, z c
(2N 1)2 decreases in N: Hence, the di¤erentiation 
0(N) is positive but
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decreases in N . That is, N(N) is strictly increasing and concave in N for N  2: Dene
	(N)  0(N) = d[N(N)]dN .
(1) If 	(N2) < k < 	(N1); then dene bN = minfN : N 2 [N1; N2] j 	(N)  kg:
Because 	(N) decreases in N; bN is well-dened and unique. Based on Corollary 1, for
any N > M such that M > 0 and N > 0, we have Nz + N(N) = Nk + c and
Mz +M(M) =Mk + c:
Note that, for any N 2 [N1; bN); 	(N) > k; and for any N 2 ( bN;N2]; 	(N) < k:
Correspondingly, for any given N and M 2 [N1; bN) such that N > M , we have N(N) 
M(M) > (N  M)k: Thus,
(N   M )z = (N  M)k   [N(N) M(M)] < 0:
That is, N decreases in N for N 2 (N1; bN):
Similarly, for any given N and M 2 [N1; bN) such that N > M , we have N(N)  
M(M) < (N  M)k. Thus,
(N   M )z = (N  M)k   [N(N) M(M)] > 0:
That is, N increases in N for N 2 [ bN;N2]:
(2) If k  	(N2) < 	(N1), then 	(N) > k for any N 2 [N1; N2): Similar to the above
analysis, for any N 2 [N1; N2]; N decreases in N:
(3) If 	(N2) < 	(N1)  k , then 	(N) < k for any N 2 (N1; N2]: Similar to the above
analysis, for any N 2 [N1; N2]; N increases in N:
Scenario B: Suppose that z c3 < t  t1  z c2 : Then given t, there exists a unique y
such that t = t2(y) = y
 1
2y 1(z c): Note that y may not be an integer. We have t > t2(N)
for N 2 [N1; y) and t < t2(N) for N 2 (y; N2]: Correspondingly, for N 2 (y; N2]; we
have N(N) = t and N = Nk+c tz : Also, similar to the proof under Scenario A, it can
be veried that 	(N)  d[N(N)]dN strictly decreases for N 2 [N1; y) and becomes 0 for
N 2 (y; N2]:
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(1) If 	(y) < k < 	(N1), then dene bN = minfN 2 [N1; y] j 	(N)  kg: Similar to
the proof under Scenario A, it can be shown that N decreases in N for N 2 (N1; bN) and
increases in N for N 2 [ bN; y]: Also note that, for N 2 (y; N2]; N = Nk+c tz increases in
N . In sum, N decreases in N for N 2 (N1; bN) and increases in N for N 2 [ bN;N2]:
(2) If k  	(y) < 	(N1); similar to the proof under Scenario A, it can be shown that N
decreases in N for any N 2 [N1; y]: Then dene bN as the smallest integer within [y; N2]:
Thus N decreases in N for N 2 (N1; bN) and increases in N for N 2 [ bN;N2]:
(3) If 	(y) < 	(N1)  k; similar to the proof under Scenario A, it can be shown that
N increases in N for any N 2 [N1; y]: Thus N increases in N for any N 2 [N1; N2]:
Scenario C: Suppose that t  z c3 : Then for any N  2; t < t2  N 12N 1(z c): Thus, we
always have N(N) = t: Thus, whenever N > 0, N = Nk+c tz , which strictly increases
in N: Also note that
	(N2) = 	(N1) =
d[N(N)]
dN
= 0 < k:
That is, when k  	(N1); N increases in N for any N 2 [N1; N2]:
Proof of Corollary 2:
(1) Suppose that t  z c3 : Then the proof of Proposition 3 directly implies that N
increases in N:
(2) Suppose that c = 0: As shown in Lemma 5, (N) strictly decreases in N: Thus we
have (N + 1)(N + 1) N(N) < (N):
Based on Corollary 1, N > 0 only when
(N) < k  (N) + 1
N
[(t  1(t>t1)
(t  t1)2
t
];
given c = 0: We can show that N strictly increases in N: Suppose, to the contrary, there
exists a particular N 2 [N1; N2) such that 0 < N+1  N : Given the proof of Proposition
3, it must be true that (N + 1)(N + 1) N(N)  k: Then we have
k  (N + 1)(N + 1) N(N) < (N);
26
which implies N = 0; based on Corollary 1 and the fact that c = 0. This is a contradition
to the assumption N > 0: Therefore, N strictly increases in N for any N 2 [N1; N2]:
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